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Populism in Bulgaria Between Politicization of Media 
and Mediatization of Politics1
Abstract. Populism as a political position and rhetorical style is nowadays an object of comprehensive 
research and multi-faceted social discussions. The strong critical attitude of populists towards the 
status quo, towards what they regard as the chimera of democracy, is generally intertwined with the 
function of the media as a corrective factor with regard to government authorities. The development 
of mankind in the present is characterized by transformation trends in technological, economic, and 
social spheres. These trends impact the political environment as well. The challenges of the economic 
crisis, as well as the migration processes are strengthening the position of Euro-skeptics and revitalize 
the development of populism.  
The present text is focused on the developments of political populism in Bulgaria. The political 
environment in the country is characterized by almost permanent merge of political entities, which 
gradually escalates the use of populist approaches, styles and rhetoric. Research attention to this polit-
ical phenomenon is determined by the success of some newly formed populist parties during the new 
century, gradually winning considerable numbers of seats in the parliament.
The use of populist phraseology is evident among all political parties in the country, whether left- or 
right-oriented. Bulgarian political actors of a populist trend – including political leaders and parties – 
have mixed, oftentimes changing, characteristics. This populist phraseology is transmitted to audiences 
mainly through the media. It has to be noted that the dynamics of the pre-election campaigns during 
the period of democratization since 1989 has been developing alongside demonopolization, liberali-
zation and transformation of the media system. Deregulation of the radio and TV broadcasting sector 
dragged on, giving way to the development of two mutually bound processes – politicization of the 
media and mediatization of politics. The paper is structured in three methodologically interconnected 
parts, presenting: an overview of the process of politicization of the media and mediatization of politics 
in Bulgaria; an analysis of the political populist trends in the country; a discussion on the connections 
between populism and the media. 
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Introduction
New information technologies are enhancing the communication process of iden-
tifying and setting the public agenda. Today, changes in society are catalyzed by the 
opportunities provided by the blogosphere and the social networks, and by mobile 
electronic connections. Mediatized mobile communications have proven to be em-
blematic for mediatized society [Peicheva 2003]. he international stratiication in 
communication development seems to be, to paraphrase Zbigniew Brzezinski, “out 
of the control” of competing strategies, including social, cultural, political, economic, 
technological, demographic, and ecological strategies [Petev 2001, p. 112].
his fundamentally new situation of social disintegration and shortage of social 
synergy is a nourishing environment for the revival of populism, primarily by non-sys-
temic political parties. hough it has one of the leading world economies, the Europe-
an Union is still feeling the sting of the economic crisis. Long-term unemployment is 
rising, and the pressure coming from the entry of more than a million migrants into 
Europe in just one year is strengthening the position of Euro-skeptics and populists. 
Populism as a political position and rhetorical style has been the object of com-
prehensive research and multi-faceted social discussions. he strong critical attitude 
of populists towards the status quo, towards what they regard as the chimera of de-
mocracy, is generally intertwined with the function of the media to be a corrective 
factor with regard to government authorities.
he prevailing approach to populism is perceived as a threat to democracy. Howev-
er, it is also viewed as an expression of democratic shortcomings. Positioned between 
the people and the elite, the nourishing element of the performances of the populist 
actors is the media. In contemporary times, when audiences have transformed from 
passive consumers to active participants in the creation of media products, the sig-
niicance of the political communication strategies has unprecedentedly risen. 
Research attention in Bulgaria has started to be focused on populism recently, but it 
is increasing in terms of the engagement of scholars and the expansion of the range of 
study. his interest was determined by the successes of newly formed populist parties 
during the new century – parties of the harder or soter variants – which succeeded 
in periodically winning considerable numbers of places in national parliaments. he 
methodological challenges brought due to the multiplicity concepts and the lack of 
clear categorical indicators makes it diicult to it the phenomenon in the traditional 
political system. Practically, almost all political formations and political actors use 
populist strategies, especially in pre-election times. hat is why it is extremely di cult 
to perceive an entire political party or a political leader a populist.
he speciicity of research on populism derives from the speciic techniques and 
approaches used by populists. Among Bulgarian researchers, there is still no unanim-
ity on populism and its speciicity. Yet this does not mean that there is no agreement 
that it involves “playing the role of the ordinary people”.
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Georgi Karasimeonov denotes three features of populism: emergence, organi-
zational form and political practices. He points out that populism arises from mass 
discontent provoked by the crisis of the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Organ-
izationally, the populist movement is formed around charismatic leaders and is built 
around centralized structures. As a political practice, populism is generally aggressive, 
sometimes violent, ignoring established democratic rules, a plebiscite-oriented, op-
portunistic and demagogic [Karasimeonov 2008].
Svetoslav Malinov [2007] deines populism as a form of political thought and 
speech, as a set of rhetorical igures and techniques, possessing a single leading char-
acteristic: constant appeal and reference to the collective image of the “people”. his 
characteristic is complemented by features such as “ofering what people want to be 
ofered”, “brilliant promises”, “identifying oneself with, and speaking in the name of 
the people”; “labeling”, etc., in the context of the seven propaganda techniques deined 
in the US in 1937 [How… 1937]. 
Daniel Smilov stresses on three aspects of the concept of populism: “At times it is 
used to describe the process of backsliding from the achievements of liberal democ-
racy made before the accession to the EU. At other times, it refers to the emergence 
and growth of nationalist or radical right-wing parties. Almost all of the Bulgarian 
scholars agree with Cas Mudde that populism is an ideology that places the people 
in opposition to the corrupt political elite” [2008, p. 26].
he conceptual schemes of Margaret Canovan [1981] and Cas Mudde [2007] 
have been used as keys to understanding and explaining the phenomenon, as well as 
to deining populism in Bulgaria. Scholars have accepted Mudde’s idea that “even if 
populism as an ideology is viewed as a basic threat, in fact the basic threat in Europe 
today is populism as a style” [Mudde 2007, p. 115]. 
Atanas Jdrebev deines populism as a way of political thinking, speaking, and 
action inherent in modern politics, which has the following characteristics: 
•	 anti-elitism	–	criticism	of	the	dominant	political	elites	as	corrupt	and	their	
opposition to the ordinary people;
•	 anti-partyism	–	opposing	traditional	parties	as	separating	the	people	and	hin-
dering the materialization of its common will;
•	 anti-institutional	–	denying	the	role	of	political	institutions	as	a tool	for	making	
legitimate political decisions, representing the common will of the people;
•	 anti-democracy	–	non-compliance	with	the	principles	of	representative	democ-
racy and their systemic undermining;
•	 anti-constitutionalism	–	opposing	the	principles	of	constitutional	order;	
•	 anti-pluralism	–	rejection	of	the	principles	of	political	pluralism	and	their	op-
position to the general will of the people;
•	 demagogy	–	populists	speak	what	people	want	to	hear;
•	 lack	of	a core	of	values,	collaboration	of	populism	with	let	and	right	ideologies;
•	 manipulating	public	dissatisfaction	in	situations	of	unsatisied	social	and	po-
litical demands;
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•	 emergence	of	crisis	in	the	legitimacy	of	the	political	system;
•	 plebiscitary	direction	–	populists	insist	on	frequent	referendums;
•	 a charismatic	leader	who	catalyses	populist	mobilization;
•	 rejecting	the	role	of	the	institutions	as	mediators	between	the	populist	leader	
and the people;
•	 using	the	resources	of	media	democracy	for	direct	and	immediate	communi-
cation between the leader and the people;
•	 opposition	of	ethnic	minorities,	immigrants	and	foreigners	[Jdrebev	2016].	
Bulgarian researchers stress on the moral overtone of the phenomenon, related to 
categories such as truth, lie, manipulation, honesty, decency, sincerity, etc. hey have 
debated whether populism is good or bad, whether or not it is a threat to democratic 
processes, etc. [Malinov 2007; Karasimeonov 2008; Smilov 2008; Kabakchieva 2009; 
Badzhakov 2010; Krastev 2007; Krasteva 2013; Jdrebev 2016, etc.]. 
here is no consensus in academic circles regarding the types of populism present 
in society. In resting upon the four types of types of populism (complete, excluding, 
anti-elitist, and empty populism) outlined by Jan Jagers and Stefaan Walgrave [2006], 
and on the indicators for them, it may be concluded that these types exist in Bulgaria, 
although they have not been classiied in the terminology used by these two authors.
Nearly all parties in Bulgaria have displayed some populist manners and have 
lirted, to a greater or lesser degree, with the people, speculating on popular expec-
tations and hopes. 
Populism in Bulgaria is visible in several variants of classiication: 
•	 classical,	social,	speciically	“pro-European”	populism;	
•	 hard	vs.	sot	populism;	
•	 right-wing	vs.	let-wing	populism.
Classical populism coincides with the European, mostly xenophobic populism of 
the 1930s; social populism, considered to be let-oriented, is associated primarily with 
the old let-wing parties and the newly formed letward-inclined parties; while the 
speciic “pro-European” populism is ascribed to newly formed parties with a liberal 
orientation. 
Hard populism has restructured itself in recent years to become a mixture of 
nationalist and extremist elements, with an accent on othering.
he sot version of populism encompasses general appeals to people, catch-all 
politics and demagogic discourses. 
he elements of let and right populism are hybrid in nature. In reality, populism in 
Bulgaria is neither let nor right, because some of the outstanding parties falling under 
this category combine extreme let and extreme right practices along with hate speech. 
he discrepancy between economic expectations and reality, between political 
expectations and concrete policies, etc., as well as the presence of contrary evaluations 
of the transition to democratic society and market economy are the grounds of the 
varieties of populism in Bulgaria and of the di culty of building a relevant conceptual 
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framework for the phenomenon. It is not accidental that the most malicious manifes-
tations of populist political actors, including in the media, have been organized ater 
Bulgaria’s accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures and are a result of disappointment 
in the efects of this new situation.  
Ana Krasteva, referring to the comparative study of populism in Central and East-
ern Europe made by Jacques Rupnik [2007, p. 130] and of the three main features he 
deines, has concluded that Bulgarian populism is a typical example of post-commu-
nist East European populism, and is highly imitative. “Extremism is not a spontaneous 
internal attitude but is a learned political game” [Krasteva 2013, p. 11].  
he goal of the present text is to examine the current developments of political 
populism in Bulgaria. he authors of this paper have undertaken a thorough research 
on the populist political developments in Bulgaria. As members of the COST Action 
IS 1308: Populist Political Communication in Europe: Comprehending the Challenge of 
Mediated Political Populism for Democratic Politics, the authors have correlated with the 
goals of a broader research, conducted in the participating 31 countries [COST 2014].
Politicization of the media and mediatization of politics 
he dynamics of the pre-election campaigns during the period of democratiza-
tion since 1989 has been developing alongside demonopolization, liberalization and 
transformation of the media system. Deregulation of the radio and TV broadcasting 
sector dragged on, giving way to the development of two mutually bound processes 
– politicization of the media and mediatization of politics. 
In spite of the fact that Bulgaria has taken considerable steps towards democratiza-
tion, the political system faces an immense challenge owing to its unclear identity, both 
at conceptual and at representative level. he long years of one-party dominance were 
replaced by an ever-growing host of new political parties, unions and organizations, 
which constantly split, regrouped and entered into coalitions, especially on the eve of 
upcoming elections. he breakdown of the bipolar model (socialists vs. democrats) 
with the aid of some newly formed structures of leadership, has failed to bring sus-
tainability to the political system which is weighed down by diicult economic and 
social tasks. Gradually, the situation of social disintegration and shortage of social 
synergy has become a good environment for the revival of populism, primarily by 
non-systemic political parties. 
On the other hand, politicians fail to carry out the necessary reforms that would 
meet the European commitment of the country and the expectations of the people. 
Even the unique Bulgarian ethnic model, formed ater long years of efort on the 
part of all ethnic groups and not by the contemporary parties and politicians, has 
been put to abusive purposes. he ever deeper gap between rulers and society has 
proved a grave obstacle for the trust and entrepreneurship of citizens. he absence of 
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distinct program platforms encourages inter-party migration and erodes the foun-
dations of political pluralism and decreasing election participation: from 90.79% in 
the irst round of elections for the Grand National Assembly in 1990, to 28.6% in the 
irst elections for the European Parliament in Bulgaria in 2007, and further down to 
20.22% for the First National Referendum in 2013 [Central Election Commission 
2015]. Slowly but steadily, Bulgarian electors have refused to yield to the instruments 
of political, survey and media propaganda, have rejected joining the process of social 
imitation, and have acquired a position of active passiveness. As a result, the eforts of 
state regulation fail to efectively overcome self-regulation that can be traced back to 
the dawn of democratic changes achieved at the National Round Table, back in 1990. 
A telling example is the Code of Conduct for Election Campaigns which forbids the 
ofering, demanding, giving out, or promising any monetary amounts, or any other 
advantage for the elector’s signature in support of, or for nomination of a candidate, 
or for voting in favour of any political party, movement or an independent candidate 
(National Round Table 1990). he observance of this self-regulatory norm has proved 
unattainable for participants in the country’s elections and thus, years later, it had to 
be legally decreed that the purchase and sale of votes is a criminal ofence. However, 
this statement repeated as a must ater every piece of political advertising has failed 
to rid the country of the problem [Raycheva 2017].
Political pluralism and the varied media environment in Bulgaria continue to ex-
perience constant di culties. he still-in-the-make civil society fails to assist the cre-
ation of a stable public basis for professional journalism. According to the World Press 
Freedom Index 2017, Bulgaria has dropped down to 109th place (out of 180 countries), 
which shows that freedom of speech and independent journalism is still a convertible 
phraseology for most of the media outlets and for many non-government organizations 
disbursing the funds of European and Transatlantic institutions [Reporters 2017]. 
Data provided by the National Statistical Institute vividly show the media trends 
in more than a quarter of a century since the start of the transition period. Currently, 
the number of print media amounts to 295 newspapers (55 dailies) with a total annual 
circulation of 315,712,000, and 668 magazines and bulletins, with an annual circulation 
of 27,831,000 [NSI 2015]. In 2015, there were 337 radio stations and 187 television chan-
nels operating on national, regional and local level terrestrially, via cable or via satellite, 
and listed in the public register of the Council for Electronic Media [Council 2015]. 
For more than a quarter of a century, political, economic and social upheavals 
have signiicantly impacted the development of the mass media system in Bulgaria 
towards quick and lexible reactions to the social processes. he major signiicance 
of television was manifested in several critical situations during the years, including: 
the TV attack against President Petar Mladenov in 1990 that compelled him to re-
sign; the resignation of the BSP Government headed by Andrey Lukanov in 1990; 
the mass media war launched by the UDF Government of Filip Dimitrov, which 
led to its toppling in 1992; the exit of the Government of Lyuben Berov (under the 
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Movement for Rights and Freedom mandate) in 1994; the withdrawal of the BSP 
Government of Zhan Videnov in 1996; the siege of the House of the National As-
sembly in the situation of governmental crisis in 1997, which led to radical power 
shit; the forced restructuring of the UDF Government of Ivan Kostov in 1999, due 
to corruption allegations; the attacks that brought about ministerial replacements in 
the Simeon II Government in 2005 and in the three-party coalition (Coalition for 
Bulgaria, Movement for Rights and Freedoms and National Movement Simeon II) of 
Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev; the constant corrective activism with respect to the 
government of Boyko Borisov (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) and 
the wide coverage of the social protests which led to the earlier resignation of Borisov’s 
government in 2013; the coverage of the pressure of continuous social protests against 
the government of Plamen Oresharski (Coalition for Bulgaria), which also led to its 
premature resignation in 2014 [Raycheva 2013]. 
he country still lacks a stable foundation on which to test the maturity and pro-
fessionalism of the media as regards providing voters the opportunity for informed 
choice under the conditions of representative democracy. he media are pushed away 
from democratic values and are involved in the spiral of obscure political and corpo-
rative interests. As a result, although considerable progress has been made regarding 
the audiovisual quality of the political advertising products, the media system still fails 
to fulil its major purpose in pre-election periods – to inform society impartially and 
on an equal footing about the participants in the political race and their platforms.
Conceptualizing of populism in Bulgaria 
he model of democracy on the make in Bulgaria delegated the diicult tasks of 
transition to the political elite and eliminated the broad participation of the people 
in the process of transformation. Although supericially heterogeneous, the political 
and the media environment (especially in pre-election times) is still not open to the 
parameters of pluralism or independence [Raycheva and Petev 2003]. 
Populist political actors 
Bulgarian political actors, including leaders and parties, that fall under the category 
of populism, have mixed, otentimes changing, features. he use of populist phraseolo-
gy is evident among all political parties in the country, whether let- or right-oriented. 
he factors favorable to the emergence and rise of populism in the country can 
be divided into internal and external. 
he external factors are related to globalization and the adherence of Bulgaria to 
the EU and NATO, while the internal ones are connected with social, ideological and 
political structuring.  
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he social factors that open the way for, and support populism are, on the one hand, 
people’s disappointment in the transition to market economy and democratic forms 
of government, as well as in the inability of the elites to work for the public interest 
and to build a well-functioning state, and, on the other hand, in the anti-minority 
attitudes of some Bulgarian citizens. “Bulgarian society is in a populist situation”, 
concludes Petya Kabakchieva [2008, p. 3].
he ideological factors are related to the efacement of relevant dividing lines. 
“Policies draw closer together, the distinctions between let and right fade, the strong 
mobilization resources are nationalism and (anti)Europeanism” [Smilov 2008, p. 26].
he political factors are also related to dissolving of diferentiations. he political 
clash “is not between let and right, reformers and conservatives, the clash is between 
the elites having growing suspicions about democracy, and the angry society having 
increasingly anti-liberal attitudes. he let-wing party BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party) 
is moving towards a centrist position, defends the Red oligarchs more than it does 
the poor and the middle class. hus, the extreme let space remains unoccupied and 
the party Ataka settles in it, as well as other nationalist formations appealing for 
nationalization” [Krastev 2007, p. 112].
In Bulgaria, complete populism, involving reference and appeals to the people, 
anti-elitism and exclusion of outgroups [Jagers and Walgrave 2006], is called “hard” 
populism. It lourished ater 2005, when the former journalist and leader of the newly 
formed party Ataka, Volen Siderov, succeeded in winning twenty seats for his party in 
the parliamentary elections. Ater 2005, members of Ataka have always been present 
in the National Assembly, and more recently, in the European Parliament as well. he 
ideology of the party tends to combine extremist right-wing with extreme let-wing 
ideas, and has evolved towards an anti-EU and anti-NATO stance. Its leader Siderov is 
a typical example of a very aggressive style combined with eclectic elements: he raises 
extreme let slogans referring to nationalization, but also spreads ethnic hostility and an-
ti-elite feelings; recently he has been making anti-migrant and anti-globalist statements. 
Other small parties are also part of “hard” populism in Bulgaria, including the 
nationalist party Bulgarian National Union, the Bulgarian National Radical Party, and, 
primarily present online, the Warriors of Tangra Movement and the party National 
Resistance, etc. 
According to the indicators of populism, parties that might be classiied in the 
range of more limited populism are the Patriotic Front coalition, headed by Valeri 
Simeonov, who is also the president of the political party National Front for the 
Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB), and IMRO (the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization – Bulgarian National Movement), headed by Krasimir Karakachanov; 
these parties are currently part of the ruling coalition. hey are nationalist parties 
that are more or less opposed to the minority groups, Roma, Turks, etc. 
Falling under the category of excluding populism, with its typical anti-elitism and 
appeals to the common people, is Nikolay Barekov’s pro-EU party Bulgaria With-
Pobrane z czasopisma Mediatizations Studies http://mediatization.umcs.pl
Data: 20/11/2019 22:15:11
UM
CS
77Populism in Bulgaria Between Politicization of Media and Mediatization of Politics
out Censorship, which was widely publicized when formed early in 2014. In recent 
months, however, it has completely broken apart. Its leader Barekov, formerly a pop-
ular TV anchorman, is a salient example of a mixed type of political populism. He 
combines right-wing ideology with letist slogans referring to protecting the interests 
of the poor. his is a typical case of populism based on unscrupulously “playing the 
role of the ordinary people”, making “brilliant promises”, and using the media for 
political purposes, turning them into political PR institutions. However, Barekov was 
later denounced by people from his own party in the Parliament as being dependent 
on corporations. At present, he is a member of the European Parliament but has been 
abandoned by nearly all members of the Bulgaria Without Censorship coalition; his 
parliamentary group now carries the name Bulgarian Democratic Centre.  
Falling under the category of empty populism, with its reference and appeals to 
the ordinary people, is the political activity of the former Bulgarian tsar Simeon II. In 
2001, he became prime minister of Bulgaria, having won votes in the parliamentary 
elections through his populist phraseology. Simeon II and the party established in 
2001 and named ater him, the National Movement Simeon the Second (NMSS) is 
precisely falling in the category of “pro-European” populism that may be deined as 
“sot” populism as well. Simeon II has a speciic style of communication marked by 
moderation in speech, a certain show of modesty and benevolence. hese traits were 
part of his charisma. He has used a technique never applied before him in Bulgarian 
politics: “the technique of non-speech” [Krasteva 2013; Malinov 2007]. His political 
style and conduct towards others are based on respect and compromise. Speciic 
for him is the style of catch-all politics. hus, the former tsar included ministers of 
diferent party ailiations in his government, and during his second mandate, he 
entered into coalition with the former Communists of the BSP, whose opponent he 
initially was. 
he present Bulgarian prime minister Boyko Borisov of the centre-right political 
party Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (CEDB), who also held two 
previous mandates (2009–2013 and 2014–2017), also falls in the category of “sot” 
populism. His style is very particular. He displays a certain amount of eclecticism, 
making references to the common people, yet also tending to discredit opponents. 
Eclecticism and aggressiveness is common to the verbal style of all “excluding” 
populists and to those with anti-elitist views. 
Charisma is the common feature of populist leaders, which distinguishes them 
from other party leaders and explains the high election results their parties have 
achieved at various times. Charismatic leaders present themselves, and are perceived, 
as father igures, who personify the messages of the respective party. he political plan 
of Simeon II in 2001 to try to “Europeanize” Bulgaria within 800 calendar days was 
a personalized plan, as is Volen Siderov’s plan to de-colonize Bulgaria from Europe. 
Attraction, not repulsion, is the symbolic resource of Simeon II underlying his cha-
risma; to the opposite, Siderov’s charisma is based on aggressiveness and negation. 
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Today, the populist stage of the Parliament is held mainly by Volen Siderov, though 
support for his party Ataka has decreased. his party joined he Patriotic Front co-
alition, made up of the political party NFSB, and IMRO, is also represented in the 
Parliament and is part of the ruling coalition. A new political party – Will, led by 
Vesselin Mareshki, with comparatively populist stance has entered the Parliament. 
he NMSS, renamed National Movement Stability and Progress since 2008, is waning 
and is not represented in the Parliament. Support for Bulgaria Without Censorship 
has already extinguished. 
The media and populism
he historical roots, the deteriorating social-economic situation, the ideologi-
cal assumptions, and the inancial dependence of certain media groups on concrete 
parties, are all especially important factors for the intense growth of populism in the 
political life of the country. 
hus, the media-related origin of the political formation Ataka is typical for 
populist leadership and style of politics. he high viewing rates for Volen Siderov’s 
ten-minute show entitled Ataka, broadcast on TV SKAT since 2003, is connected 
with the appearance of the eponymous political party and the position it won in 
politics in 2005. It is believed that the growth of this party and its membership was 
due to this political broadcast. Contributing to success was likewise its national daily 
party newspaper, also called Ataka. Later on, the appearance of TV Alfa in 2011, ater 
Siderov broke his relations with TV SKAT, contributed to the continuing support for 
Ataka and its leader over the years. he party would hardly have won enough votes 
to send its representatives to the Parliament if its populist slogans had not reached 
the viewers and readers of these nationally disseminated media. 
Similarly, the emergence of the populist political party Bulgaria Without Censor-
ship, created in 2014 by the journalist Nikolay Barekov, was accompanied by opinion 
poll results furnished by concrete survey agencies, in combination with the support 
of TV 7, of which Barekov had been the executive director before undertaking a po-
litical career.  
Other media have also contributed to the expansion of populism. Some non-gov-
ernmental organizations, marketing agencies and associations have also promoted 
interest constructing this mediatized reality [Peicheva 2011].
“From the very start of the changes, especially ater the democratic forces came to 
power and soon fell in 1992, the media have sent suggestive messages that »they are 
all scoundrels«, »politics is a dirty business«, »the parties are corrupt«, »parliament is 
nothing but palaver«. Populist attitudes and frenzies were purposely being fomented 
by the media” [Badzhakov 2010, p. 132].
With regard to fomenting populist hate speech and constructing the “image of 
the enemy”, some national media have evidently played a role in stimulating popu-
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list processes by serving as a platform for plainly racist and misanthropic populist 
vocabulary [Spasov 2014]. 
In developing dynamically, the media also create a variety of forms used for polit-
ical presentation. Populism is expanding in entertainment television as well, thereby 
leading some theorists to announce the start of a new populist practice based on the 
electronic media – show populism [Kabakchieva 2009, p. 1].
Hardly any political leader fails to be present in the new media, including blogs, 
social networks, sites of political parties, online television. heoretical and empirical 
analyses particularly emphasize the impact of populists on the online sphere. How-
ever, the activities of Internet trolls in online discussion forums that aimed basically 
at provoking the user, has not yet become a topic of researchers [Raycheva 2013]. 
Conclusions
he contradictions in the existing terminology, the national speciics of theorizing 
on populism, and the practices of the Bulgarian political leaders bring to the fore 
several sets of discussion topics.  
Firstly, the identiication of anti-elitism and its manifestations. Is it true that the 
negative attitude towards those labeled as “elite” – including politicians, corporation 
members, bankers, oligarchs, businesspersons, etc. – is an expression of populism, as 
some European researchers claim, or does it rather represent a general denial of their 
elite quality? Is it not true that there is a widespread strong disapproval of the drastic 
dividing lines – in terms of wealth, power, governance – between them and other sig-
niicant people, such as scientists, poets, artists, musicians, dramatists, medics, teach-
ers, engineers, journalists, etc. (who, in the traditional perception of people, represent 
the authentic elites)? Is not the dubious and corrupt behavior of a considerable part 
of those who are labeled “elite” a strong justiication for the growing dislike towards 
such people throughout the world? hat is why the answers to these questions should 
be sought upon making corrections in the interpretation of this public intolerance 
as a form of populism. he deepening dividing lines can hardly be easily accounted 
for only in terms of populism. Such an understanding rather appears to be a subtle 
way to disregard the existing contradictions by placing them in a diferent framework 
of explanation. Elite status should generally be accompanied by intellect, creativity, 
spirituality, respect, upholding of principles, honesty, etc. Are these characteristics 
typical for the elite under consideration? 
Secondly, it is also a debatable question whether nationalism, racism, and xenopho-
bia should be placed within the framework of populism. hese are separate political 
ideologies and prejudices, and their self-reliance can hardly be questioned. he fact 
that they are applied in the rhetoric and programs of political leaders and parties can 
hardly change their speciic nature.  
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hirdly, the characteristic features of propaganda are “poured” into terminology 
relevant to populism. In our times, nearly all the above-mentioned seven propaganda 
techniques deined as far back as 1937 have been placed in the international research 
framework regarding populism. In this sense, the classiication of populism into dif-
ferent types seems an artiicial approach, given that the phenomenon manifests itself 
in a mixture of critique, speciic ideologies, stereotypes, insinuations, etc. 
his discussion comes in response to the practical activities of political leaders and 
to the restless attempts at conceptualizing the phenomenon of populism. Although the 
multi-faceted approaches of the Bulgarian scholars to the matter, there is no consen-
sus in the academic circles regarding the essence and the types of populism present 
in society – whether it can be viewed as an ideology, a distinct political movement 
or a rhetorical style, used by all political formations. hus, there is not enough evi-
dence whether populism has to be applied only to certain political parties and their 
leaders and whether their activities can be considered as a threat or as a corrective 
to democracy.     
he results of the content analysis and the existing ambiguity in the conceptual 
framework support the standpoint that populism can be adequately identiied in 
cases where speculation occurs with the unrealistic expectations of people, when 
politicians irresponsibly speak in the name of the people, or when they irresponsibly 
make promises. 
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